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COMMENT
ULRICH IMMENGA*
The internationalization of markets is a fact, a desirable fact. The
process includes two components: an increasing volume of international
trade, marked by transborder investment, and the formation of larger
market areas. The European Economic Communities are seeking to
complete their Common Market by 1992. Socialist countries are further
developing their counterpart to the Common Market. Current rumors
reveal that the United States is interested in achieving a free trade agree-
ment with Japan, although Japan will only consider such an agreement if
Hong Kong, Taiwan and other border states of the Eastern Pacific Area
participate. Free Trade Treaties increase the transnational flow of prod-
ucts and services.
Free markets tend to encounter restrictions by participants, how-
ever. Does this development then necessarily mean a new world of anti-
trust? I would respond no, seemingly in accordance with Dr. Markert.'
But the importance of antitrust issues will change. Although the issues
have been long recognized, they have not always produced controversy.
Part I of my Comment will analyze the principal issues discussed by
Markert and emphasize the resulting problems to be solved. Part II will
address whether it is a concern of antitrust that the internationalization
of markets is producing bigger and bigger business firms. In Part III,
this Comment will discuss how transborder business activities increase
the need for extraterritorial application of national laws and whether
there are new trends in Germany as a result. Finally, Part IV will focus
on the developing idea of competition between states and their industrial
policies and whether this idea should be recognized. It is a problem that
requires more definitive answers.
My Comment will not extend to issues of a more general character
such as the relevance of structural market elements in applying merger
control provisions. Nor will I treat the influence of the coming "Euro-
pean Merger Control Act," which has been extensively described by
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1. Markert, German Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
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Markert, 2 including the German view that there are inherent dangers if
competition is not the determining factor in applying the statute. I fully
support Markert's analysis.
I.
Indeed, in Germany the hottest debate focuses on the determination
of markets in which there are international elements. Should we utilize
an economic approach to the definition of such markets, or, is it neces-
sary to apply a more legalistic approach, which focuses on national mar-
kets but reflects, of course, foreign competition in these markets?
The debate was initiated particularly by authors who might be con-
sidered to be more or less close to business circles. A starting point is the
relevance of market shares under German merger control law, given ef-
fect through rebuttable presumptions. Markert clearly states the
problems involved, and, in my view, supports the right answer. His pa-
per analyzes the wording of the relevant provisions, their legislative his-
tory, and the practical difficulties in defining international markets. 3 The
most important argument, however, regards legislative intent in relation
to the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC). The German legis-
lature expressly provided for the extraterritorial application of the ARC
and recognized the effects doctrine. The underlying idea is, obviously,
the protection of domestic markets even in case of international restric-
tions. Consequently, the share of a nationally, and not internationally,
defined market should be determinative.
Two'issues are raised by this perspective. What is the legal rele-
vance of market shares in merger control? And how should the effects of
foreign competition on domestic markets be evaluated?
Market shares still play an important role, though their predomi-
nant character seems to be declining. The presumptions, as currently
being emphasized, don't really influence the control practice. The inter-
pretation of these presumptions by the courts supports this trend. The
difference in market shares between the leading firm and its most impor-
tant competitors is being taken into account. Barriers to entry into mar-
kets are increasingly recognized, certainly under the influence of
economists' views, as important factors necessary to evaluate the impor-
tance of market shares in order to state a market dominating position.
High shares on markets with low barriers cannot reflect a strong posi-
2. See, e.g., id. at 918-26.
3 Id. at 900-18.
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tion. These arguments are discussed at present particularly in view of a
developing concentration in the field of food-retail stores.
Barriers to entry are likewise important to evaluate potential compe-
tition, a crucial issue when determining foreign competition in Germany.
There is no controversy that the potentiality of competition is as impor-
tant as its actual form. But what are the criteria required to judge and
recognize competition in its potential form? Markert proposes a rather
restrictive view and a case-by-case approach. 4
It seems to be impossible to present an exact pattern or a kind of
check-list to evaluate the influence of foreign competition. With Mar-
kert, there has to be a distinction between competitors from countries
outside or inside a free trade system such as the European Economic
Communities (EEC) or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
The likelihood of competitive pressure from firms which will not encoun-
ter considerable state barriers to enter a national market is obvious and
calls for a particular law against restraints of competition within the
system.
Besides these considerations, numerous other factors might be rele-
vant. The Monopolies Commission thoroughly dealt with the problem of
a geographical definition of international markets and listed the following
criteria to evaluate potential barriers to entry:
- Volume and development of imports and exports
- Distribution of capacities
- Transportation costs
- Duration of supply contracts
- Existence of representations and service organizations
- Buyers' preferences
- State barriers to trade
- Non-tariff barriers 5
Furthermore, the Commission suggests that price differences for a given
product over a certain period of time should be considered, since parallel
developments might result from one market.
According to German Law, potential competition exists only if
there is objective capability and a subjectively reasonable business incen-
tive to enter into a market.6  This subjective requirement will be particu-
larly difficult to assess in a given situation. Finally, only a case-by-case
approach, supported by economic considerations, seems to be feasible.
4. Id. at 917.
5. MONOPOLKOMISSION, FUSIONSKONTROLLE BLEIBT VORANGIG: HAUPTGUTACHTEN
1978/1979 163 (1980).
6. Judgment of Dec. 13, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., WuW/E [BGH] 2050
(Bauvorhaben-Schramberg).
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II.
Bigger firms are-seemingly inevitably-the result of the interna-
tionalization of markets. Transborder participations in shares and merg-
ers are accelerating this trend. Two questions which relate to firm size
have to be answered. Is bigness a requirement to compete in interna-
tional markets? Should bigness be a concern of antitrust?
Competitiveness in international markets is a frequent argument
made by merging companies in an attempt to overcome antitrust barri-
ers. The debate is as long as the German practice of merger control. No
unambiguous answer has yet emerged. Objective authors are quite reluc-
tant to accept this antitrust defense. Nevertheless, in certain merger
cases it might be argued that the combination is necessary to compete
effectively in foreign markets with big competitors. Economies of scope
and scale, or worldwide service organizations might be the underlying
rationale. The German merger law recognizes the potential conflict be-
tween a competitive national market structure and requirements of inter-
national competitiveness in a particular way. A merger that is denied by
the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) may nevertheless be permitted for rea-
sons of international competition by a political decision issued by the
ministry of economics. Only one case has won this argument until now,
however. And furthermore, it cannot be said that merger practice in
Germany has negatively influenced the capability of the industry to com-
pete effectively in foreign markets.
Bigness as such has not yet been of primary antitrust concern in
Germany. The existing legal presumption to deem a merger unlawful
has not gained momentum in practice. The German view is based on
economic and social values to be obtained by antitrust. This was obvi-
ously stated by the legislator when enacting the merger control act in
1973: "Centralization of economic power destroys the basis of our free
society. Democracy and a market system are unthinkable without a de-
centralization of power."' 7  Merger control, therefore, is an instrument
to foster competition and to prevent economic concentration as well.
International competition opposes this concept of merger control.
A merger might lead to huge firms on a national level with immense
inherent economic and political power. These firms become, in fact, im-
mortal and for social reasons they will not be able to go bankrupt. Thus
merger control through applying criteria of competitive markets is in-
creasingly unable to prevent bigness because of increasing international
7. BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 6/2520, at 16.
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competition. That means the internationalization of markets leads to na-
tional concentration of business power as long as merger control is not
based on criteria of bigness.
This problem of concentration, although recognized, remains un-
solved. The United States discussed several bills during the 1970s which
would have restricted economic concentration, but no legislation was
passed. The German Monopolies Commission recently proposed partic-
ular rules to control mergers by big companies . But the present govern-
ment is obviously reluctant to present such a bill.
III.
Extraterritoriality becomes an increasingly important issue, particu-
larly in merger cases. But there is no new state of the law. German
competition law is ruled by the effects doctrine. The text is unambigu-
ous. The ARC applies if restraints of competition are affecting the terri-
tory of the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of any foreign
origin of these restrains.9
Discussion and court decisions are turning around the effective
reach of the legislation. Is any effect in Germany a relevant effect? Law
of conflicts considerations as well as international law are supporting ar-
guments to formulate reasonable restrictions. As a result, courts are ap-
plying an approach which evaluates the relevance of anticompetitive
effects according to the particular objective of a legal provision. This
reasoning may be best illustrated through an analysis of merger control.
The notification requirements do not exercise a considerable influence on
merging firms. Therefore, a relatively slight impact on German markets
suffices to apply the law. In contrast, in cases involving the interdiction
of a merger, there is a strong interference with business interests. But on
the other hand, an interdiction requires the establishment or strengthen-
ing of a market dominating position of German territory which always
considerably affects competitive interests.
The United States' discussion of balancing competing state interests
when exercising extraterritoriality has not yet really reached German
fields. There have been international law attempts to produce solutions
which might be legally enforced. They are based on the argument of
nonintervention. The courts are obviously quite reluctant to enter into
8. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, GESAMTWIRTSCHAFTLICHE CHANCEN UND RISIKEN WACH-
SENDER UNTERNEHMENSGROSSEN: HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1984/1985 187 (1986).
9. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrnkungen [GWB] 98 (2), 1980 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB] I
1761 (W.Ger.).
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this international arena. The Kammergericht considers comity of na-
tions an important factor in cases involving conflicting legal systems, but
does not regard comity as a legal argument.10 The German view does
not seem to accept the idea of a legally binding balancing of interests
approach. A political solution performed only by diplomatic channels
appears to be feasible.
IV.
The internationalization of markets does not solely concern private
business. States are very often highly interested in the flow of trans-
border trade and in the efficiency of their industries-both are crucial
elements to preserve national economic wealth. State intervention, there-
fore, becomes more frequent as international competition develops. Be-
sides international competition of firms, states become competitors by
themselves. Quite often they identify themselves with particular
branches of the industry to support their competitive efforts. Industrial
policy thus replaces competition policy. The reasons behind this attitude
might vary. Very simply, sometimes bigness is being supported if it is
regarded as a means to meet competition in foreign markets. In Ger-
many, under this heading, an imminent concentration within the defense
industry is welcomed by the government, and antitrust considerations
are set aside. Particular support is given to highly technologically ad-
vanced firms with the idea that new markets will be conquered. "Picking
the winner" is the catch-phrase. Financial aid is granted to promote re-
search and development and firms are sometimes urged into a coopera-
tion to accelerate technological progress. By this means, states are
turning objectives of, private business into their own aims. Furthermore,
structural changes within the economy are often hurting industries.
There might be a governmental interest to fetter negative consequences
which are particularly being felt on labor markets. Again, financial aid
or cartel-like agreements are applied to support the industry. Protection-
ism becomes unavoidable.
These trends are obvious and have been described extensively. First,
industrial and competition policy have to be reconciled on an interna-
tional level, a very difficult objective to obtain, keeping in mind that even
national solutions are often impossible. Second, antitrust issues, as in the
case of mergers, cooperations, and cartel agreements, are characterized
by the participation of states. Consequently, it becomes increasingly im-
10. Judgment of July 1, 1983, Kammergericht, W. Ger., 24 WuWE [OLG] 3051, 3059 (Morris-
Rothmans).
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portant to distinguish between state and private business. The law of the
United States presents solutions based on the doctrines of act of state and
foreign government compulsion. Similar distinctions are being made by
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That means competi-
tion by states in international markets has to be controlled by imposing
antitrust responsibility on the states in a manner similar to private busi-
ness and, simultaneously, by imposing a consequent extraterritorial ap-
plication of antitrust laws.
Finally, the generally granted antitrust exemptions in national laws
for export cartels become a contradiction in international markets.
States should care about competition outside their boundaries and not
abandon their policies just to foster export interests.

